It takes about 6 weeks of regular practice to increase the flow and knowledge of your emotions. The average college graduate only uses about 20 words in this category of emotions. This category makes the gut, ego, mind, and heart all integrate what one is feeling to find expression. This challenge is about Feelings experienced when our needs are being fulfilled. Before I begin the challenge I would like to offer up a wee bit of biology; just what I know to be true.
All the nerve endings in our physical bodies are sending messages to the gut and the brain all the time. As babies we started training these messages to have certain definitions and some specialized responses. We can retrain these responses when we need to do something differently and recode the messages. Lots of folks know how to turn off their feelings of being ticklish. We get s of messages all the time, all day long and culturally we have trained ourselves to turn down the volume on most and we have not trained ourselves how to use the messages to enhance our journey.
As so many authors I have been reading as of late are saying, if we are going to experience a paradigm change and become a more loving and focused people, then we need to understand and use our emotions at a higher fitness level. Here are the 50 words about feelings experienced when our needs are being fulfilled , I am asking you to 1 add 10 new words you can think of to the list. Please share them in the comments section. You might noticed these words form an integration from at least four stimulus areas of the body to have an effect.
They will strengthen your heartfelt thinking along with other muscles in your body. Finally 4 would you take a minute and create a new word and define it for us — give us a new word and definition to describe an emotion where all four parts of the stimulus are integrated. If you order anything from Amazon from my site, I will receive a few beans in my bucket — Thank you. Tags: emotions , fitness , gratitude , guidance , inspiration , learning , skill building , vocabulary , Wisdom.
Thanks — you gave me something to think about. Vered, Thank you so much for coming by and commenting — I was feeling a bit Lonely here. One of the things about all emotions is that about every 90 seconds we are experiencing another one…so expanding the vocabulary can just make them more useful and powerful in our daily lives. These are all high vibrational words, so just sitting with each one and pondering it a bit, it going to do a lot in terms of helping people to feel good. Nice one. Hugs, Melody Melody Deliberate Receiving recently posted..
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Melody, You made me laugh so hard, I just had to worry about the housebroken for a moment or two. I live with one of the happiest puppies in the world — Zip is great vibrational energy for me…. What seemed to be similar 'expressions' were then taken to refer to similar mental states. What Darwin and the other writers overlooked in their thinking was that they were not observing expressions of any mental state but rather direct animal responses of an instinct sort to specific stimuli.
They, however, named these responses by applying conventional terms,  and in this way animals began to be endowed with all types of emotions and other sorts of feelings. Finally, this mode of thinking developed to the extent that Darwin  could write that 'man himself cannot express love and humility by its external signs, so plainly as does a dog.
Bartlett's statement concerning the knowledge and cautiousness of hyenas. He was considering human feeling behavior on the one hand and animal instincts on the other, but Darwin is misled by. Among the many evidences which we might quote from the 'Expressions' to indicate this identification is Darwin's statement, that because the tender feelings are compound states and not simple feelings he could mention only weeping as their expression. If such be the case, is it not strange that current psychologists so readily accept the mentalistic continuity doctrine with its implication that emotions are persisting potencies which operate as properties of men and animals.
A careful study of actual behavior discloses definite continuities in the activities of man and animals occasioned by similar organization and common external surroundings, but there are none the less just as definite discontinuities between the two types of organisms due to disparities of biological and psychological development and differences in surroundings. At the point of emotional behavior it is safe to say that observation discloses indefinitely more discontinuity than continuity. But although this admission on Darwin's part implied a doubt as to whether the crude activities of animals and the refined behavior of human individuals are similar, his authority seems to be so incontestable as not to arouse comment when he implies that abstraction, denial, affirmation, and meditation are emotions, the expressions of which can be analyzed.
For fear, however, that this would be too great a disturbing factor in his work, Darwin ascribed this inconstancy of the relation between the emotions and its expression to the misguidance of the imagination. Most incomprehensible it is that psychologists are not more sceptical of the doctrine that animals have emotions, if it is true that such a doctrine is based upon the sort of thinking we have been indicating. Surely there can be no question as to the vulnerability of Darwin's psychology. To indicate but a few weak spots we might ask how plausible it is that animals should voluntarily acquire emotional expressions.
Further, what value can a theory have that fails to distinguish between thinking, and emotions and other types of feeling behavior. Again, we might ask whether such crude transmission of acquired behavior as Darwin supposes is consonant with observable facts. Hence, we might conclude that if the belief that animals have emotions is based upon the Darwinian foundation, it lacks much in scientific validity. But let us turn to the actual observations themselves, for we must not dismiss the problem without an attempt to examine some types of animal behavior which appear to have some resemblance to the emotional activity in human beings.
Consider the action of the chipmunk stimulated by footsteps approaching from the rear, while he is calmly nibbling at some garden green. Immediately there is a start and shift of position while the animal turns to face squarely the approaching object; then scampers towards his hole or other place of safety. Now much as the activity just described may resemble an emotional situation, a careful examination of the details indicates no breakdown of stimulus-response coordination.
The start observed is nothing but the ordinary change of attitude which we find in all attention responses. In fact this attention start, which superficially appears like an emotional phase of behavior, is always found present and in addition to the emotional phase in all actual emotional conduct; in sequence it precedes the emotion-initiating perceptual or ideational process.
Far from proving the presence of emotional behavior in animals, the attention-start points to the possibility of describing whatever activity we find in animals in their ordinary surroundings by referring to the practically full complement of congenital response systems with which they adapt themselves. Such acts as the attention-start the animal is uninterruptedly performing during each hour of its active life, and this fact would seem to indicate that these responses are due to a definite form of response system.
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And now we may inquire into the findings of physiological research for light upon the problems of emotions. In particular, we might expect to gain some information from such experiments as are designed to test the Jamesian theory of emotions. Unfortunately physiologists are parallelists and their work is seriously compromised by the assumption that in an emotional activity the organic changes are either the cause or the outcome of a psychic state called the emotion. Cannon  proposes to discover by the study of animals what.
In consequence, the essential differences in behavior are entirely overlooked and the assumption of a continuity in the behavior of man and animals results in endowing the latter with activities that are really found only in the former. In general, we might say that the physiologists have really been studying i visceral reflexes in pain, hunger, and fear-rage instinct behavior,  and 2 the relative functioning of the cephalic and more posterior portions of the organism in instinct action,  but not emotions. Sherrington's conclusion from his experiments not only does not militate against the James-Lange-Sergi theory of the emotions, but on the contrary offers some evidence that he is not occupied with emotions at all.
His discussion reads much like a tremendous overemphasis of psychocephalic parallelism and nothing more. The transaction of cord and vagus cannot prove that emotions are cerebral processes, since the supposition that there exists an emotion in the form of a psychical adjunct has absolutely no basis in any observable fact. On the contrary, physiological experiments do appear to confirm the view that psychological behavior is the activity of the whole complex organism.
Now the experiments seem to indicate that depending upon the intricacy of the behavior, the reaction systems may function when the organism is only partially coordinated. This fact is substantiated by Goltz's  decerebrate dog which 'showed' anger, but not fear, joy, and affection. May we. The writer hastens to add that he accepts in its entirety the description of the behavior of the dogs which Sherrington has published, but reserves the right to reinterpret the terms joy, disgust, friendliness, so as to exclude completely the objectionable anthropomorphic implications.
This reservation is necessary in view of the unfortunately extreme poverty of psychological language with which to describe animal reactions. Indeed, could Sherrington set aside his psychocephalic parallelism, he would be very sympathetic with our view concerning the absence of emotions in animals, since he writes that 'there is no wide interval between the reflex movement of the spinal dog whose foot attempts to scratch away an irritant applied to its back, and the reaction of the decerebrate dog that turns and growls and bites at the fingers holding his hind foot too roughly.
When we turn to the problem of emotions in infants we find a similar dearth of conditions capable of giving rise to emotional disturbances. Watson's studies of infants demonstrate the absence in the conduct histories of young children of the characteristic chaotic or no-response conditions, with the replacement of visceral and other reflexes. Watson does not agree with this view, however, and indeed believes he has found in infants three types of emotions, but our reading of his material convinces us that he has looked for and found only some specific instinct responses.
The names he gives to these instinct responses, 'fear,' 'rage,' 'love,' seem to us to be arbitrarily applied and interchangeable. In this manner he obliterates the boundary between emotions and instincts, and moreover by invoking the criterion of non-training for hereditary acts he achieves the result that we have already described, namely, a discovery in infants of three kinds of emotions.
The upshot of this procedure is that Watson veers considerably from the objective position and tends to interpret infant behavior, not from the standpoint of actually occurring responses to specific stimulating conditions, but as the manifestations of hereditary tendencies. What observer can overlook the differences between actual emotional behavior and comparatively simple positive responses which are offered to such stimuli as restraining, pulling a blanket away, striking, etc.
We insist that while the failure of a stimulus-response coordination among older infants begins to be possible, because they have been acquiring responses to stimuli, yet it is true that as a matter of fact genuine emotional conduct will be an extremely rare occurrence.
Emotions and Expressions. Singularly enough, although Dewey  had long ago pointed out that expressions could have no meaning so far as the acting.
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Illustrative of the influence which subjectivism exerts upon our minds is the fact that in the same papers  in which Dewey abjures emotional expressions, he employs himself in the defense of James' 'paradox' concerning the order of apparition of the invisible emotion and its visible physiological colligate. No doubt the reader recalls that the motive for this defense was Dewey's attempt to translate a philosophical conception into the biological terms which James's theory supplied.
Dewey really meant to demonstrate that feelings are the internalizing of activity or will in the sense that an emotion is a report feeling in consciousness of an act previously performed. But our purpose is not to revisit the scene of former battles; rather we wish to point out that when we stray from a description of actual behavior, the 'expressions' remain in our thinking, much disguise them as we may.
Has Dewey avoided an unpsychological dualism by calling an emotion not an expressed entity, but a repercussion in consciousness of an organic happening? It is our opinion that Dewey has merely placed in relief a psychophysiological parallelism which at the point of emotions inspired James very little. For this reason Dewey could write  that "Prof. James himself does not seem to me to have adequately realized the inconsistency of Darwin's principles, as the latter states them, with his own theory.
When emotions are studied as concrete behavior, we find absolutely no warrant for including in our description of them any dichotomy between the emotional acts and their expression. Moreover, there is no meaning in the question whether emotions precede or follow the expression. It is obvious, therefore, that the emotion-expression dichotomy may be entirely rejected irrespective of the specific interpretation one makes of emotional behavior. We are inclined to believe that this dichotomy goes back in the final analysis to a nonnaturalistic psychological hypothesis.
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What happens is that the organism is left in a crucial situation in the most striking cases without certain expected or desirable means of adaptation, either because of not having a response system for the particular stimulating circumstances or because of some failure of such an acquired response system to operate. Emotions are therefore essentially 'no response' activities. The individual thus left without a directed mode of adjustment is thrown back upon primary responses, namely, organic reflexes. It is these replacement reflexes which give emotional conduct the appearance of positive adjustments.
From this it follows that emotional conduct must not be interpreted as hereditary forms of adaptational activity, since emotions are either due to the break-down of an acquired stimulus-response situation or the absence of such a coordination which should have been developed to meet the needs of the present situation. The criterion for what reaction systems should have been developed depends upon the observation of those definite reactions the individual has actually acquired, namely, the precurrent perceptual responses. The latter, however, are not complete for the present situation without the consummatory reaction systems that are not operating at the time, but which apparently should have been acquired contemporaneously with the precurrent responses.
Our criterion is of course based upon the apparent concrete needs of the individual at the moment, and is therefore frankly ephemeral, since the needs of the indi-. One of the significant results of the reactional interpretation of emotional conduct is that it forces to the front the distinction between emotions and feeling behavior. Fundamental in such a distinction is the fact that, unlike emotional conduct, feeling behavior of every type always involves the operation of definite response systems. A fact it is that almost every segment of behavior in which is found an emotional phase, will also include one or more feeling reactions, but in every instance the observer can adequately discriminate between the two types of conduct.
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